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THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY AND THE 
ROBERTS COURT: SOME HINTS FROM 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 
POLffiCAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREM-
ACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. 
HISTORY. By Keith E. Whittington. 1 Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007. Pp. xii + 303. $ 37.50. 
Mark Tushner 
Every law student learns that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian institution. Why then do politicians put up with it?' 
Robert Dahl's answer was that judicial review wasn't really 
countermajoritarian after all, as long as we pay attention to a na-
tional governing coalition that holds sustained power over a long 
enough time.4 Keith Whittington offers another answer: Politi-
cians like judicial review. It gives them another instrument for 
advancing their policy agendas.; Or, more precisely, politicians 
1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics. Princeton Universitv. 
2. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law. Harvard Law School..! would like 
to thank Scott Lemieux for helpful comments on a draft of this Review. 
3. Law students also learn that Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
hardly presented knock-down arguments for judicial review. that the Constitution pro-
vides several mechanisms that politicians could use to assert control (sometimes indirect. 
sometimes direct) over the judiciary. and that the only one politicians use to do so is the 
power to nominate and confirm sympathetic justices to the Supreme Court. What this 
amounts to is that politicians do indeed put up with judicial review. 
4. Robert Dahl. Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a Na-
tional Policy-Maker. 6 J. PUB. L. 279 ( 1957). Writing in 1957. Dahl focused on governing 
coalitions that controlled Congress and the executive branch. When government is di-
vided. as it was during most of the final quarter of the twentieth century. there is noma-
jority for judicial review to counter. at least when political parties divide over issues sub-
ject to judicial review. (When they do. someone with significant political power is bound 
to like what the courts do.) 
5. It also gives them a convenient punching bag-a target for cheap-talk criticism 
whereby criticizing the courts allows them to score points with some constituencies that 
dislike what the courts have done without actually doing anything about the underlying 
policies because. for example. actually doing something would annoy other constituen-
cies the politicians care about. as Mark Graber argued in a major article that set out the 
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like judicial review for that reason often enough to make them 
quite wary of doing away with the mechanism on those occasions 
when it annoys them. This essay is more a set of reflections pro-
voked by Whittington's analysis than a book review: After sum-
marizing Whittington's account, I draw on Whittington's insights 
to offer my speculations about the future of judicial review un-
der an Obama presidency. But, for those who want a bottom-line 
assessment, I offer my judgment that Whittington's work is one 
of a handful of works on constitutional history and theory writ-
ten in the last decade that everyone interested in those subjects 
should read. 
Focusing on presidential support for (and occasional oppo-
sition to) judicial review, Whittington relies heavily on the 
schema offered by Stephen Skowronek, who (oversimplifying) 
identifies two categories of what he calls political time and four 
general types of presidencies.6 Start with political time. Every 
year (in ordinary time) we can see a political order-a set of in-
stitutions and policy and ideological commitments-in place. Af-
ter an initial period in which a political order or regime works to 
get its footing,7 a successful regime becomes resilient (to use 
Skowronek's term), sustaining itself over a reasonably long pe-
riod.8 Presidents are routinely elected from only one of the major 
parties, for example, and even presidents from the other party 
who manage to scrape into office basically accept the resilient 
order's premises.9 Eventually, though, regimes decay. Their insti-
tutional innovations become routinized. Office-holders who at 
one point may have been enthusiastic promoters of the regime's 
constitutional vision become mere functionaries working a day 
job. 10 The regime's policy agenda may get exhausted, with bad 
policies replacing the generically similar bold ones that gave the 
line of analysis that Whittington develops. Mark Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Diffi-
culty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEVEL. 35 (1993). Note. 
though, that Whittington focuses on presidential choices. treating the president as the 
leader of a coalition with legislative support. 
6. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM 
JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993). 
7. I should note that political scientists distinguish between political orders and 
political regimes in ways that may be helpful for their inquiries but that are in my view 
irrelevant to those of constitutional scholars. Whittington uses the term ·•regime." 
8. Success is not guaranteed, of course, a point to which I will return. 
9. Think here of Dwight Eisenhower and to some degree Richard Nixon, with re-
spect to the New Deal/Great Society regime. 
10. For my observations about this phenomenon in connection with the Reagan/ 
conservative regime of the late twentieth century, see Mark Tushnet, What Difference Do 
Ideas Make?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 447 (2008) (reviewing STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE 
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BA TILE FOR CO!'.'TROL OF THE LAW (2008) ). 
2008] BOOK REVIEWS 345 
regime its oomph. And the regime's ideological commitments 
may become stale or merely words that politicians mouth with-
out really believing or acting on them. So. the second period of 
political time is one in which a previously robust regime becomes 
vulnerable. 
Now, as to Presidents. Reconstructive presidents, to use 
Skowronek's term, initiate what become resilient regimes/ 1 
while affiliated ones attempt to perpetuate those regimes while 
simultaneously seeking to put their own stamp on the regime. 
Reconstructive presidents and, even more, affiliated ones engage 
in a politics of "articulation," setting out the regime's commit-
ments and vision. 12 (Think here of Ronald Reagan as the recon-
structive president followed by either of the Bushes as affiliated 
ones, or Franklin Roosevelt and any of his Democratic succes-
sors.) Preemptive presidents sometimes are elected while a re-
gime is resilient and do their best to undermine it-make it vul-
nerable- but sometimes are elected as a regime is degenerating. 
Whittington works out the implications of this schema for 
judicial supremacy with helpful case studies. 13 Consider first re-
constructive presidents. They are elected when the prior regime 
has degenerated to the point of exhaustion, and seek to initiate 
bold changes in institutions and constitutional visions. But even 
if they are elected and have substantial, even overwhelming, 
support in Congress, they are almost certain to face a judiciary 
skeptical of their initiatives. After all, the Justices in place will 
have been appointed during the prior regime and, as we will see, 
will have spent a fair amount of energy developing constitutional 
doctrines compatible with that regime's constitutional vision. As 
Whittington puts it, "the Court seeks to consolidate inherited 
constitutional understandings in the late stages of a declining re-
gime" (p. 72), and will have "cement[ed] constitutional under-
standings at odds with those of the ascending administrations" 
(p. 73). 
This is obviously a prescription for constitutional confronta-
tion. A reconstructive president will come up with some innova-
11. For obvious reasons. reconstructive presidents are rare. 
12. Again. for reasonably obvious reasons. the odds are against an affiliated presi-
dent doing as good a job of articulation as a reconstructive one. but affiliated presidents 
have to try if they are to regard themselves. and are to be regarded by political elites. as 
people of substance. 
13. His arguments are a bit too formulaic for my taste. but he does an extremely 
good job of showing readers the broad outlines of the political foundations of judicial 
supremacy. as the title of his book promises. 
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tion, which the old Court will believe cannot survive constitu-
tional scrutiny according to the doctrines it has developed. It will 
cast constitutional shadows over the reconstructive president's 
proposals, sometimes to the point of invalidating policies central 
to the nascent regime. And the President will respond by chal-
lenging the Court. sometimes directly by proposing institutional 
changes in the practice of judicial review. and sometimes indi-
rectly by asserting an independent ·'departmentalist'' power to 
act on the president's own constitutional understandings in the 
face of a court's contrary understandings. The examples Whit-
tington offers are mostly familiar, but are cast in a new liRht by 
his analysis: Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, 4 and 
Abraham Lincoln's and Edwin Meese's challenge to the theory 
of judicial supremacy .1' 
Affiliated presidents face a different situation. The new 
constitutional regime is in place, and the affiliated president's 
job is to preserve and even extend the scope of its institutions 
and constitutional understandings as circumstances change. Here 
Dahl's analysis has its real bite. Affiliated presidents have allies, 
not enemies. in the courts, because the resilience of a new re-
gime means that at some point old Justices are replaced by new 
ones appointed by reconstructive or affiliated presidents. 
What can the courts do for a resilient regime? Presidents 
and Congress have limited time and political energy. They will 
spend them on what they regard as central issues. But at any 
time there will be "outliers"-geographic regions as yet uncom-
mitted to the regime ·s constitutional understandings, or substan-
tive areas that plainly require change if those understandings are 
to become deeply implanted in society, yet politically too touchy 
14. Notably. Roosevelt's supporters described the Court-packing plan as part of a 
struggle against what they called the .. old Court ... The term has become standard. but the 
earliest use I have been able to track down is bv Robert Jackson in a letter written in 
1950. See Mark Tushnet. with Katya Lezin. What~ Really Happened in Brown v. Board of 
Education. 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867. 1896 (1991) (quoting Jackson's letter). My guess is 
that Jackson had used the term earlier. probably in ROBERT JACKSON. THE STRUGGLE 
FOR JLDICIAL SCPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 
(1941). but a quick look at the book's preface and conclusion didn't turn up the term. 
15. Presidents who seek to reconstruct the constitutional order may not succeed 
overall. and part of their failure may be that their challenges to the courts fall flat. I be-
lieve that the Reagan Revolution did achieve some changes in the constitutional order. 
though not as extensively as Reaganites had hoped. For my analysis. see MARK 
Tt:SHNET. THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (1999). It isn't clear to me that Skow-
ronek's scheme handles this possibility well. but perhaps that's because failures of this 
sort are rare: After all. by hypothesis the prior regime has degenerated and. though it 
might stagger on for a while. eventually something new-a reconstructive presidency-
will replace it. 
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or relatively unimportant to Congress. "For the affiliated leader, 
enhancing judicial authority to define and enforce constitutional 
meaning provides an efficient mechanism for supervising and 
correcting those who might fail to adhere to the politically pre-
ferred constitutional vision·· (pp. 105-06). The courts can serve 
as a convenient but essentially administrative mechanism for 
bringing these outliers into the constitutional order. 1h 
In addition, the courts may have rhetorical resources un-
available to presidents. Their obligation to explain their deci-
sions, and the fact that they make decision after decision, means 
that they have an opportunity to develop a reasonably general 
account of the resilient regime's constitutional understandings. 
In Whittington's words. "It is the classic task of judges within the 
Anglo-American tradition ... to render new decisions and lay 
down new rules that can be explicated as a mere working out of 
previously established legal principles'' (p. 84 ). Presidents. in 
contrast. only sporadically make speeches illuminating those un-
derstandings. 
More boldly, affiliated presidents may try to use the courts 
to "overcome[e] gridlock'' (p. 124) caused by the strategic posi-
tions recalcitrant opponents of the new constitutional regime 
may occupy. And. if not "use the courts." at least rely on the 
courts to take the initiative. because "[t]he Court can sometimes 
move forward on the constitutional agenda where other political 
officials cannot" (p. 125). "[C]oalition leaders might be con-
strained by the needs of coalition maintenance," but "judges 
have a relatively free hand" (p. 125). This "use'' of the courts, 
though, poses risks. The courts may push the regime's constitu-
tional principles further and faster than is politically wise, and 
the regime's political leaders may find themselves on the defen-
sive. Indeed, in this way the courts can contribute to making a 
resilient regime vulnerable, which may be part of the story about 
the Warren Court and the demise of the New Deal/Great Soci-
ety regime. 17 
16. This is the central. and correct. argument in L. Scot Powe·s account of the War-
ren Court. Lt:CAS A. POWE. JR .. THE W ARRE!\ CO CRT A'\JD AMERICA!'O POLITICS 
(2000). Powe argues that the Warren Court took as its targets Southern race policies and 
scattered cultural policies at odds with the constitutional premises prevailing elsewhere 
in the political system. 
17. ·'Part of" only. though. It would be a mistake to exaggerate how much a court 
can do to undermine a resilient regime. Mv guess is that the most likelv storv is that 
courts don't get the memo about a regime's ·vulnerabilities soon enough. a·nd go.on their 
merry way articulating and extending the regime's principles without realizing that thev 
are sapping rather than enhancing the regime ·s power. ~ · 
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Preemptive presidents face a special strategic problem. 
Sometimes they take office because they manage to persuade 
the public that they remain committed to a resilient regime's 
constitutional vision even if in their hearts they want to trans-
form the regime. 1 ~ At other times they take office as a regime 
becomes vulnerable, but do not themselves have the program, 
vision, or charisma to be reconstructive presidents themselves. 19 
They are likely to face opposition in Congress and to some de-
gree in the courts. But they can turn divided government to their 
advantage by seeking judicial confirmation of executive preroga-
tive. The judges in place might be sympathetic to such claims for 
doctrinal and political reasons. They will have ''inherited from 
affiliated administrations" (p. 169) doctrines supporting execu-
tive authority. And, though Whittington doesn't make this point 
explicitly. they may see the preemptive president as an accident, 
soon to be replaced by an affiliated one whose exercises of 
presidential power they will want to endorse. Finally, preemptive 
presidents need to get their authority from somewhere when 
they face congressional opposition, as they will. They don't have 
much of their own. but they can try "to borrow from the author-
ity of the courts in order to hold off their political adversaries" 
(p. 195). 
One final point before I move to some speculations about 
the future of judicial supremacy. Whittington emphasizes the 
growth of judicial supremacy during the twentieth century, both 
in terms of the judges' self-understanding and, perhaps more im-
portantly, in terms of the degree of political commitment to judi-
cial supremacy (p. 25). He suggests that politicians have had in-
creasingly strong reasons to support the Supreme Court. The 
reconstructive presidency of Ronald Reagan was less ambitious 
than that of Franklin Roosevelt (p. 232), assuring the American 
people that Reagan's policies would strengthen rather than de-
stroy the social safety nets that Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson's 
regimes had created. Even a reconstructive president could hope 
that the Supreme Court would assist in articulating regime prin-
ciples in the way the Court ordinarily does for affiliated presi-
dents. Further. drawing again on Skowronek's account of the 
18. Again the protean figure of Richard Nixon comes to mind. He certainly pre-
sented himself as accepting the principles of modern liberalism and even as extending 
them to new domains such as the environment, and vet he also saw how Barry Goldwa-
ter's candidacv and Southern strategy presented opportunities to build a conservative 
Republican piny that might displace the New Deal/Great Society regime. 
19. I would describe Bill Clinton in those terms. 
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ways in which regimes leave a residue even after they have been 
displaced, Whittington describes the doctrinal thickening that 
occurred during the twentieth century with respect to essentially 
every possible ideological and political commitment a President 
could have (p. 283). Doctrinal thickening means that every 
member of a ruling coalition will have some basis in constitu-
tional law for its assertions that the Constitution requires satis-
faction of its policy preferences, and that the Court cannot pos-
sibly satisfy all the demands on it.co So, for the future, we might 
expect Presidents to have increasingly ambivalent views about 
the Supreme Court. In the twenty-first century, the Supreme 
Court will be useful and annoying to every President- useful be-
cause the Court can serve to articulate regime principles and can 
do some policy work that Presidents would rather not expend 
time and political capital on, and annoying because the Court's 
failure to satisfy all the demands emanating from a President's 
political supporters will put pressure on the President to do 
something about the Court. 
I have merely sketched the schema that Whittington devel-
ops with much more nuance and detail, but even the sketch 
should convey the power of the analysis. Can it help us think 
about the Roberts Court and the Obama presidency? 
Barack Obama appears to have the potential to be a recon-
structive president. He ran as the candidate of change, the party 
controlling the presidency had been almost completely discred-
ited, and Obama's party had gained control of Congress even be-
fore his election and his coattails expanded the Democratic 
party's congressional majorities. From Whittington's schema we 
might expect confrontations between the Obama administration 
and the federal courts. Building on foundations laid during the 
Rehnquist era, the Roberts Court might find that some "green 
energy" initiatives amounted to regulatory takings. Requiring 
that individuals purchase health insurance might be found to vio-
late constitutionally protected interests in personal autonomy. 
More likely, some peripheral details in some Obama policy ini-
tiatives might bump up against Rehnquist-era constitutional doc-
trines.21 
20. Think here of Kelo v. City of New London. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). and. more gen-
erally. of the limited nature of the Rehnquist Court's so-called takings and federalism 
revolutions. For my account of these matters. see MARK TCSH:"ET. A COURT DIVIDED: 
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005 ). 
. 21. A strategic-minded Court might take on the Obama presidency only on the pe-
nphenes so that the Court could assert its awhority to super\'ise policy on constitutional 
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The president might respond with challenges to the courts. 
We might see a new Court-packing plan.cc Or, noting the sharp 
reduction in the Court's merits-docket in the past decade, Con-
gress and the president might reduce the Court's budget-for 
example, by cutting the number of law clerks each justice is au-
thorized to hire. Or, drawing on proposals recently made on the 
Right, Congress might make the job of Supreme Court Justice 
less _attractive _in other ways, ~ith the ~ual goals of encouragin& 
Justices to retire and of lowenng pubhc esteem for the Court-
And. of course, the President and his surrogates could re-
articulate departmentalist constitutional theories, asserting that 
the Supreme Court's views on constitutional issues are interest-
ing and worthy of consideration but do not displace the inde-
pendent judgments reached by the President and Congress. As-
suming that the Obama presidency does become reconstructive, 
eventually the Supreme Court will give in, exhausted in the 
struggle or re-populated by new Justices in tune with the new 
constitutional regime. 
The difficulty with this analysis, though, is that we live life 
forward but understand it only in retrospect.24 As a candidate, 
Barack Obama spoke of change, and an astute and careful 
reader of his speeches might be able to extract a governing phi-
losophy and constitutional vision from them. But, for now, we do 
not really know what that vision will turn out to be as events 
shape his presidency. Nor can we know what policy initiatives, if 
any, will provoke confrontations with the courts. The list could 
go on, but the central point is that we cannot know whether an 
Obama presidency will in fact be reconstructive. 
How does a failed attempt at a reconstructive presidency fit 
into Whittington's and Skowronek's schema? It would seem that 
in retrospect they would see such a presidency as a preemptive 
grounds. without going so far that the administration would respond forcefully. 
22. I have noted occasional expressions in the Left-liberal blogosphere indicating 
that some there understand that the number nine is not written into the Constitution's 
description of the Supreme Court. Perhaps. though. the Court's size has been fixed by 
convention. or at least there mav be a constitutional convention barring changes in the 
Court's size motivated (solely?) by a desire to alter outcomes as predicted by politicians. 
23. See, e.g .. Da\'id Stras. Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again. 
91 MI:--iN. L. REV. 1710 (2007): Nelson Lund & Craig S. Lerner. Precedent Bound?. 
NATIONAL REVIEW O-.;LINE. March 6. 2008. available at http://www.nationalreview.coml 
commentllwld_lemer200603060828.asp. 
2.\. Or. in Kierkegaard's more precise formulation. "'life can never really be under-
stood in time simply because at no particular moment can I find the necessary resting-
place from which to understand it backwards."' I S(>REN KIERKEGAARD. JOURNALS AND 
PAPERS .\50 (Howard V. Hong & Edna Hong eds .. 1967). 
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one. 
2
' Yet that simply doesn't feel right. if only because no mat-
ter how badly an Obama presidency might go, the Reagan Re-
publican revolution seems quite unlikely to start up again: It's 
going to be too difficult for Republicans to regain control of 
Congress within the relevant time frame. 
This suggests that. however much Whittington's schema can 
help us understand constitutional history and theory and alert us 
to some things we might pay attention to during an Obama 
presidency, its predictive utility may be low.2" Perhaps, as Skow-
ronek and Whittington each suggest in their own ways, the pos-
sibilities of reconstructive presidencies have all but disappeared 
anyway. Judicial supremacy may have become so entrenched by 
now that no President would sensibly take it on, particularly if 
the courts blocked presidential policies only on the margins.2' 
Skowronek ends his book expressing the hope that his categories 
might be made obsolete by political innovations introduced by 
creative Presidents who would be neither reconstructive nor 
preemptive. So, too, for the patterns of interaction between 
Presidents and courts. The Obama presidency may be as inter-
esting for students of the courts as was the Reagan presidency. 2x 
25. Skowronek writes of a politics of .. permanent preemption.'· SKOWRO:"EK. supra 
note 6. at 442. 
26. In saying this. though. I must acknowledge Skowronek's stunning insight pub-
lished in 1993. that Bill Clinton faced a real risk of impeachment. See id. at 444 (asserting 
that preemptive presidents face ··the high risk of suffering the ultimate disgrace of im-
peachment"). 445 ( .. The threat of impeachment figures prominently in the politics of 
preemption .. ). 446 ( .. Clinton comes to the politics of preemption as a matter of course ... ). 
27. It may be that an Obama-led Democratic party will change from the structure it 
had during the Reagan revolution as a coalition of interest groups. but the interest 
groups will remain important within even a transformed party. And some of those groups 
remain strongly committed to a vision of judicial supremacy shaped bv their experience 
with the Warren Court and its immediate successor. I should add that some interest 
groups remain important even within the more ideologically coherent Republican partv. 
2H. ..Interesting .. does not necessarilv have positive connotations. · 
